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It is a great pleasure to give a speech on "Japan's Financial 
Power" as a Distinguished Lecturer Series speaker. 
If you see a recent league table of Euromarket bond 
underwriters, you may find many Japanese brokers and bankers high 
in the list. Various bank asset rankings indicate Japanese 
banks almost monopolize the top five banks in the world. When a 
US Treasury auction takes place, the degree of enthusiasm of 
Japanese investors decide the level of interest rates. These 
news certainly indicate Japan's financial power which has emerged 
only in recent few years. Our substantial current surplus, net 
creditor position and overseas investments are accountable for 
the emergence of Japan as the World banker. 
The current spectacular phenomena appears to me of temporary 
nature. Firstly, the thrust of our long-term capital outflow 
comes from acquisitions of long dated bonds, especially US 
Treasury bonds, triggered by rapid expansion of current surplus. 
Since the net long-term capital outflow by far exceeds the 
current surplus, the difference is financed by net short-term 
international borrowings in the approximate amount of $250 
billion. The reliance on short-term funding could be justified 
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as our long-term assets largely consist of highly liquid US 
Treasury bonds. Furthermore, Japan's gigantic international 
presence in terms of securities investments should be curtailed 
significantly when the current surplus should be reduced 
substantially in the future. Such sign has been discernible 
already in recent past. Secondly, our banks' assets have 
increased due to two reasons. The sharp yen appreciation in the 
past four years has doubled their dollar translated domestic 
assets. In addition, their overseas assets have risen sharply 
from less than 10% of the total assets to 40% or more in the past 
six years. It is important to note that their equity to total 
domestic assets has remained more or less stable for the past 
decade. This might mean that the rapid build up of overseas 
assets by Japanese banks has not, by and large, been commensulate 
with growth in overseas earnings. Suffice it to say that 
banking assets have to be supported by reasonable earnings, 
especially in the light of fluctuating interest rates. Having 
said that, Japan's somewhat exaggerated financial power is likely 
to disappear in the not too distant future as the trade 
imbalance should be corrected by one way or another. However, 
our aggressive investments in R&D efforts as well as production 
capacities, the very reasons that have brought forth our 
international competitiveness, will continue to improve the terms 
of international trade in Japan's favor. Accordingly, our 
-2-
intrinsic trade surplus will gradually enable our industries to 
build up production facilities in overseas markets. It should be 
noted that Japan's manufacturing industries will be in a 
position to control flow of goods in and out of Japan in most 
cases. Our productivity gains vis-a-vis other nations will 
enable us to produce goods competitively and sufficiently even in 
the light of rapidly aging population. It is worth mentioning 
that our direct investments will rise rapidly while our trade 
surplus are on the wane. This will cause our manufacturing 
industries will rely increasingly on overseas long-term financing 
both in terms of debt and equity. Furthermore, our overseas 
investments will be paid back only if they will increase 
positively productivities in the local markets. Having said 
that, our financial power will become more invisible and will 
depend upon its contributions to the world economy, or supports 
by overseas consumers and investors, or market forces. 
Now, I would like to review our economy and finance in order to 
assess realistically our financial power. I believe that our 
economic and financial system is still unchanged from the one 
that has more than encouraged or literally forced our people to 
carry out savings, investments and exports for the purpose of 
catching up with the Western civilizations since the start of the 
Meiji eia.—Our industrial success Has increased tremendously 
productivity of manufacturing. The excessive production 
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capabilities are used to increase exports and are not made 
available for raising standards of living of the general public 
so far. Of course, our exports in relation to GNP or sales 
during the past three years have been cut almost in half, not 
because our export unit volume has declined, but because yen 
proceeds of export sales have been cut in half due to the drastic 
yen appreciation. 
I believe that we have not gone through a real economic 
adjustment in our economic structure. Instead, what we have 
done, so far, is stimulating domestic consumption and investments 
by means of easy money and public construction works. Our 
exports in dollar terms are running currently somewhere around 
15% above last year. And also, our resilient unit export volume 
has enabled our manufacturing industries to operate at near full 
capacity, and to boost their earnings despite the higher yen. 
Imports are rising rapidly as our domestic economy needs more 
raw materials related to active construction expenditures. In 
addition, imported manufactured products in relation to total 
imports are rising very rapidly. However, we do not see real 
penetration of imports yet. The automobile trade is the most 
important in terms of export value, or representing one third of 
our total exports. We import this year about 130,000 units of 
Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Volvo, Porche and some expensive models of 
American cars, as compared to export units of 6.6 million. If we 
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are looking forward to a practical solution to close a trade 
gap, we should be importing millions of automobiles, and reduce 
exports also by millions. These changes in exports as well as in 
imports should drastically reduce our automobile production from 
the current level of 14 million to below 10 million, which 
should reduce our trade surplus dramatically. 
As I look into the trade picture in Japan, I have not seen such 
real solution to have taken place yet. What we are facing in 
Japan is that we have to choose what industries or which 
companies will be allowed to exist, as we inevitably reduce our 
trade surplus significantly either by means of a US economic 
slowdown or higher yen or more protectionism. Then, the most 
important issue will be "how" to do it. 
Here, we have the most difficult problem to be solved. As you 
know perhaps well, when our industries faced a rapid yen 
appreciation, our monetary authorities created excessive 
liquidity in the market to drive up asset prices. Many hard hit 
industries have been greatly helped by selling assets and 
realizing capital gains. Our financial as well as economic 
system is playing a role of shifting resources from one sector to 
another to foster and help our industrialization. We still have 
a coal industry which has not internationally competitive. The 
way we had helped it was not so clear to the outsider including 
ourselves. The Japanese electric utility still now and steel 
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industries until recently buy or bought coal at much higher 
prices than international prices. These two industries pass 
those high costs onto their customers, their prices are either 
regulated or fixed unofficially. Here, we try to eliminate 
market forces to play a role but let "visible hands" to keep our 
any existing industries intact. 
Since this "manipulating" system works well, we are keeping our 
exports still largely intact, and also rule out significant 
inroads of imports at bay. As I see our trade surplus to resurge 
again, we will see in the not distant future a real adjustment 
coming, which has been long overdue. I do think such adjustment 
will result in not because of our policy change but because of 
the market forces which cannot be controled by the government due 
to the following reasons. 
Firstly, the US will not politically and economically tolerate 
the persistent trade imbalance. With the strong yen plus some 
forms of protectionism, especially, the anti-dumping charges or 
its fears on the part of Japanese manufacturers, the production 
shift from Japan to the US of many items will be accelerated 
rapidly. Our industries will make overseas investments in order 
to protect their markets. This cannot be our governmental policy 
because it will certainly create hollowing effects in our 
^frd-ustries.—Therefore, our government will not play a positive 
role and let Industries to decide their overseas investments. 
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Secondly, imports of various manufactured products should rise 
rapidly, given the wide price differences between Japan and 
abroad in many items. There exist many, both formal and 
informal, barriers to protect domestic producers. However, the 
wide price gaps will create a huge profit opportunity to attract 
imports. Because of multi-layers of walls and moats, it may take 
a longer time but it will come, especially, when the overseas 
supply exceeds demand and finds capacity to export. 
Thirdly, our consumers are more knowledgeable than before. Our 
consumers are allocating their purchasing power to their 
likings. This has created wide differences in profitability 
among producers of consumer goods in the same industry. If 
foreign products offer more value for price, our consumers are 
willing to buy them regardless of their origins. 
Fourthly, our important function of the domestic banking will 
be undergoing a rapid change, in my opinion. As mentioned 
earlier, our banking industry has created huge liquidity by 
expanding credit in the domestic market which has caused stock 
prices and real estate to appreciate sharply. These high asset 
prices naturally attract money as well as attention from public 
at large. 
During the past few years, we have seen an interesting topic 
"insider information" which has not been discussed widely in 
Japan heretofore. The public started to be alerted when we saw 
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Tateho Chemical got into financial difficulties last year after 
it speculated in the government bond future market and its losses 
wiped out its equity practically. Maybe, some explanation is 
needed to illustrate a degree of speculation. In the fiscal year 
ended March 1987, its sales were about $46 million with working 
capital and fixed investments in the amount of $29 million at the 
year-end. It increased its equity excessively to $135 million 
by selling new shares in order to earn financial income by 
employing "no cost11 equity money. However, its annual dividend 
payments increased to $5 million. Considering tax burdens at 
about 60% of income, Tateho needed $12-13 million or 25% or more 
on its sales to service dividends. When higher yen reduced its 
operating profits to nil, Tateho had to earn financial income at 
least to cover dividends. According to newspapers, it went as 
far as to expose itself in the government future market in the 
maximum amount of $3,500 million or over 70 times its sales. 
This illustrates how our excessive liquidity has been exploited 
in an extreme case. 
The case in point is that Tateho, after the huge losses in the 
future market and amidst such rumors, asked its bankers to come 
to the meeting. One bank sold a big block of shares upon such 
notice. This caused a big surprise and resentments among public 
at large. If, in the past, banks were notified any important 
news, they were supposed to help client companies without paying 
any attention to their own interests. After this incident, our 
securities law was revised for the purpose of tightening insider 
trading regulations and will be put into effect next spring. 
Several months ago, shares of Sankyo Seiki, a manufacturer of 
precision equipment, went up sharply just before the announcement 
of Nippon Steel's acquisition of a minority stake in the 
company. As the rumor of insider trading spreaded out, TSE and 
MOF were forced to investigate and announce the findings. 
Although no criminal prosecution procedures were taken, this 
incident has illustrated that insider trading could be considered 
immoral and criminal, finally in Japan. There are two important 
observations from this. Firstly, Nippon Steel, which is the 
bluest of blue chip companies, is gettig into a new business in 
order to diversify. It has been devoting its time, efforts and 
money to produce best steel in the world so that our automobile 
and all other assembly manufacturers can compete internationally. 
The fact that it has decided to diversify its business 
indicates that it will not be considered as a special protege of 
MITI any longer as it competes with anybody else. Secondly, on 
the insider information, several officials at both companies 
bought Sankyo Seiki shares before the announcement of the equity 
participation. People were shocked that staffs of Nippon Steel, 
super elites by any standard, even demean themselves by making 
money illegally. These two factors created sharp criticism 
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against such insider trading. I am convinced that this incidence 
does indicate that close working relationship between the 
government and Nippon Steel may have ended, if not too 
apparently. Unlike the period of catching up, private interests 
do not coincide with national interests. 
Fifthly, as our overseas investments are increasing rapidly, we 
will face many important issues. So far, we have made 
significant overseas investments in Southeast Asia for the 
purpose of outsourcing labor intensive components and products. 
However, trade surplus between Japan and these countries is 
rising. In the U.S., trade friction has made our automobile and 
electronics industries to shift production from Japan to the U.S. 
by building local factories from the scratch. Also, many larger 
companies are buying big companies here such as CBS, Firestone, 
and Intercontinental Hotels. In these major acquisitions, just 
like our Treasury bond purchases and real estate acquisitions, it 
is curious to find that these acquisitions do not lead to 
reduction of exports from Japan. Unless we see acquisitions to 
replace Japanese exports, our direct investments through 
acquisitions are quite different from the solution to the trade 
problem. If we are going to make real investments to replace our 
exports, there are two important factors to be considered. 
Firstly, our investments in the manufacturing sector in the U.S. 
and elsewhere should improve dramatically productivity of local 
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manufacturing and produce good profits, part of which can be 
repatriated to Japan. 
Secondly, Japan's economic system has to be yielding to market 
forces, departing from the past practices of helping industries 
at any costs. Japan's industry has outgrown its government. It 
is inconceivable that the government is telling the industry how 
to cope with international competition. If the government 
intervenes the industry from now on, it has to be from the view 
point of protecting consumers or public investors. In order to 
help industries against overseas competition, always, public or 
consumers have picked up tabs without knowing the fact or even 
willingly as they know they can benefit by the stronger 
industries. But, since our industries are shifting production 
from Japan to abroad, the government cannot foster such trend as 
it creates domestic redundancies, and, neither can discourage 
such trend as it is vital in the interest of industries to 
preserve their markets. The government has to retreat from a 
position of a playing manager in our industries to a position of 
an impartial referee. 
To sum up, I believe that our economy moves toward more market 
oriented system and this will help our economy prosper together 
with the rest of the world economy. Our younger generations are 
more honest and realistic what they like as compared to our 
generations or older who have been imbrued with the old values to 
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keep Japan's catch-up with the West as priority, ahead of 
individual needs. This will lead to reduce our current financial 
power but will eventually build up direct investments which will 
be supported by local markets and, therefore, their dividends 
will be paid to Japan to support our consumption. 
